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Reactions to EPA's Interim Guidance:
The Growing Battle for Control over
Environmental Justice Decisionmaking
JUNE M. LYLE*
In a total work, the failures have
their not unimportant place.
- May Sarton
INTRODUCTION
In February of 1998, in response to a growing national call for environmental
policies that protect all minority communities from disproportionate levels of
pollution, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA" or "Agency") released its
interim environmental justice guidance ("Interim Guidance").' The Interim Guidance
establishes policies to ensure that federally funded state environmental permit
programs do not violate Title VI's antidiscrimination requirement.2 Almost
immediately, the Interim Guidance incurred tremendous negative response from a
surprising range of interests, including state environmental agencies, mayors of
minority urban communities, and the grassroots environmental justice movement.
Such vituperative reaction from these various levels led the EPA to acknowledge
that it had blundered by not sufficiently considering the interests of affected groups,
or "stakeholders," in developing the Interim Guidance.3 To date, however, there is no
indication that the EPA has attempted to analyze the origins and larger implications
of this widespread disapproval. This Note attempts to develop such an analysis,
specifically to suggest some lessons that the EPA should take away from its
unfortunate experience in issuing the Interim Guidance. Part I provides a brief
background ofthe environmental justice movement, including its origins and relevant
recent developments. Part II discusses the EPA's historically conflicted relationship
with the environmental justice movement as a backdrop for understanding the current
policy conflicts. Part III offers an overview of the key provisions of the Interim
Guidance issued in February 1998. Part IV analyzes the response to the Interim
Guidance from stakeholders at the state, municipal, and grassroots levels and
explores the reasons behind the negative reactions. Finally, the Conclusion suggests
lessons that the EPA must learn from these reactions in order to better frame
successful environmental justice policies in the future.
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, IndianaUniversity School of Law-Bloomington; M.A., English,
1994, University of Illinois. I would like to thank Professor John Applegate for his thoughtful
comments on this Note. I would also like to thank Bill Simmons for his steadfast support in
law school and other endeavors.
I. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (visited Jan. 19, 2000) <http:lles.epa.gov/
oeca/oej/titlevi.html> [hereinafter Interim Guidance].
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994).
3. See EPA Official Says Consultation Before Guidance Release Insufficient, 22 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 779 (July 24, 1998).
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I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
A. Origins
The core principle of the environmental justice movement is that "[t]he nation's
environmental laws, regulations, and policies have not been applied fairly across all
segments of the population," with low-income and minority communities bearing a
disproportionate pollution burden.4 Sociologist Robert Bullard, a leading expert on
environmental justice issues, has identified five basic elements of the environmental
justice framework: a right of all individuals to be protected from pollution, a
preference for prevention strategies, a shift to polluters and dischargers of the burdens
of proof, a definition of discrimination that includes disparate impacts and statistical
evidence, and an emphasis on targeted action to redress unequal risk burdens.'
Environmental justice issues are also referred to by the terms "environmental racism"
and "environmental injustice," which reflect slightly different perspectives on
essentially the same issues.6
Early signs of the environmentaljustice movement were evident in the 1960s, when
individual minority and low-income communities fought the siting of landfills and
dumps in their neighborhoods.7 However, most commentators point to opposition to
the siting of a hazardous waste landfill in predominantly black Warren County, North
Carolina in 1982, as the origin of the environmental justice movement as it exists
today.8 The Warren County protest involved national civil rights organizations such
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") and
the United Church of Christ, as well as community members.'
The Warren County controversy sparked initial attempts to determine whether
minority communities bear disproportionate pollution burdens. First, the General
Accounting Office conducted a limited investigation that concentrated on the siting
of hazardous waste landfills in the South, finding that three of the four largest
landfills were located in predominantly black, low-income communities." The United
Church of Christ followed with a nationwide study of hazardous waste sites in 1987,
which concluded that race was the most significant factor in locating commercial
4. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR at xv, xv (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
5. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra note 4, at 3, 10.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of the varying terminology employed
by environmental justice commentators, see Gerald Torres, Environmental Justice: The Legal
Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & COM. 597, 603-05 (1996).
7. See Bullard, supra note 5, at 3-5.
8. See, e.g., id. at 5.
9. See Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Justice: Normative Concerns and Empirical
Evidence, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s: REFORM OR REACTION? 231, 234-35
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 3d ed. 1997).
10. See Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens andDemocraticJustice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 431, 434-45 (1994).
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hazardous waste facilities." In 1992, the National Law Journal published the results
of a special investigation, which found that EPA enforcement of environmental laws
showed race bias. 2 In reporting that the EPA responded more quickly to violations
and sought stiffer penalties in nonminority areas than in minority areas, the study
served to bolster the arguments made by grassroots environmental justice
organizations and to bring the issue to the attention of policymakers and the legal
community."
An influential 1993 law review article on environmental justice concludes that
current evidence tends to support the notion that poor communities are
disproportionately affected by environmental burdens and suggests the "strong
possibility" that minority communities also are disproportionately affected.'
4
However, while environmental justice studies have done much to draw attention to
environmental justice concerns, they have been quite limited in number as well as in
scope.'" The existing body of environmental justice research has tended to focus on
the siting of hazardous waste facilities, and critics have challenged the findings of
each of the studies mentioned above on various grounds.'6 Indeed, numerous articles
in recent years have critiqued claims of environmental injustice, 7 contesting the
limited empirical research available 8 or suggesting that disproportionate
environmental burdens are the result of legitimate market choices made by low-
income people.'9
B. Developments
Recent developments have served to make environmental justice one of the fastest
growing environmental issues of the 1990s, culminating in the EPA's decision to
issue its Interim Guidance in 1998. The academic treatment of environmental
ll. See id. at 435.
12. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at SI.
13. See id. In the past year, several sources have reported that the EPA has conducted
studies that refute some ofthe conclusions of the National Law Journal study. See EPA Studies
on Superfund Site Populations Fuel Industry Opposition to Title VI Guidance, 29 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 317 (June 5, 1998). The EPA has been criticized heavily for not disseminating the
results of its research. See David Mastio, EPA Keeps Key Documents Secret: They Contradict
New Agency Policy on Environmental Justice, DET. NEVS, July 17, 1998, at A 1.
14. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 796 (1993).
15. See id.
16. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE 18-27 (1998).
17. For a discussion and analysis of the major criticisms of environmental justice, see
Torres, supra note 6, at 607-12.
18. See RoliffPurrington & Michael Wynne, Environmental Racism: Is a Nascent Social
Science Concept a Sound Basisfor Legal Relief?, HOUS. LAW. Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 34.
19. See e.g., Vicki Been, Analyzing Evidence of Environmental Justice, 11 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 1 (1995); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV.
75 (1996); Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103.
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inequities got its start in the field of sociology, particularly through the research of
Robert Bullard, whose 1990 study Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and
Environmental Quality0 has been extremely influential in this field. The subject
began to receive attention in the legal literature in the early 1990s, beginning with
influential articles by Rachel Godsil and Richard Lazarus.2 The legal literature on the
subject has grown exponentially in the past five years, with various legal
commentators evaluating the evidence of environmental inequities and offering a
number of legal approaches for addressing the problems of environmental injustice.'
In a development that had its impact largely within the beltway, the environmental
justice movement more formally defined its political agenda at the First National
People ofColorEnvironmental Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C.3 During the
1991 conference, the 600 conferees voiced their commitment to a fight against
environmental racism, and articulated seventeen "Principles of Environmental
Justice."'24 Among the principles were demands for "public policy [to] be based on
mutual respect and justice for all people" and for "the right to participate as equal
partners at every level of [environmental] decision-making."' Among the conferees
was Rev. Benjamin Chavis, Jr., who had been instrumental in the United Church of
Christ's hazardous waste siting study,26 and who would shortly be named to the
Clinton-Gore Administration's transition team regarding environmental issues.27 On
the executive front, in 1994 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, which
requires each federal agency to "make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission' ' and to conduct all activities affecting human health or the environment in
a manner that does not discriminate by race, color, or national origin in accordance
with Title VI.29 Clinton and Gore implemented the policy upon the recommendation
of their transition team-in an attempt to increase the body of knowledge about
environmental justice issues and to require federal agencies to incorporate
environmental justice considerations into the decisionmaking process."° The EPA's
reluctance to comply with this Executive Order and the problems that arose when the
20. ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DixiE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1990).
21. See Lazarus, supra note 14; Rachel D. Godsil,Note, RemedyingEnvironmentalRacism,
90 MICH. L. REv. 394 (1991).
22. See The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10543 (Oct. 1995). The article noted in 1995 that although the legal field had
not yet adequately addressed environmental justice, "legal scholars and practitioners are
increasingly interested in this issue." Id. at 10552.
23. See Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra note 4, at 272.
24. Id. at 274.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 275-76.
27. See Deeohn Ferris, A Call for Justice and Equal Environmental Protection, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra note
4, at 298, 299.
28. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
29. See id.
30. See Torres, supra note 6, at 615-16.
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agency finally attempted compliance by issuing its Interim Guidance are best
understood in light of the EPA's historic attitude toward the environmental justice
movement, discussed in Part II below.
The environmental justice case lav has grown in recent years as well, with most
federal cases being brought under either the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI.3 In a series of cases, federal courts have denied
equal protection challenges to the siting of solid waste facilities and landfills in
predominantly minority areas.32 This approach has consistently failed because the
minority plaintiffs have been unable to prove intentional discrimination in the siting
decision, as required by the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence.3 Some
legal scholars and activists have seen promise in using Title VI to bring
environmental justice claims.34 Under Title VI, plaintiffs need not prove
discriminatory intent if regulations pursuant to Title VI validly prohibit actions that
result in disparate impact.35 Despite the legal community's enthusiasm for Title VI
as a theory for environmental justice claims, the case law remains limited. 6
The Supreme Court had agreed to hear one such case during its 1998-1999 Term,
which challenged a permit to site a hazardous waste incinerator in the mostly black
city of Chester, Pennsylvania.37 The Third Circuit had held that a private right of
action exists to enforce EPA's discriminatory effect regulations under Title VI. 8
Despite much anticipation on the part of environmental justice groups and industry,
the Supreme Court dismissed the case and vacated the Third Circuit's decision after
the permit for the incinerator was revoked.39
Those with an interest in environmental justice issues have turned their attention
to a predominantly black community in Louisiana's "cancer alley," where community
members brought a Title VI challenge against a permit granted to Shintech, a
31. See Michele L. Knorr, Comment, Environmental Injustice: Inequities Between
Empirical Data and Federal, State, Legislative and Judicial Responses, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL.
L. 71, 90-98 (1997).
32. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd 977 F.2d 573 (4th
Cir. 1992) (unpublished disposition); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb
Co. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264
(I 1 th Cir. 1989); see also Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (a § 1983 challenge).
33. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
34. See Donna Gareis-Smith, Comment, Environmental Racism: The Failure of Equal
Protection To Provide Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 13 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 57, 76-78 (1994).
35. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (1Ith Cir. 1993).
36. See Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Is Title Vla Magic Bullet? Environmental
Racism in the Context of Political-Economic Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 1, 27 (1996).
37. See Supreme Court Agrees To Review Civil Rights Decision by Third Circuit, 29 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 372 (June 12, 1998).
38. See Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.
1997).
39. See Supreme Court Dismisses Challenge, Vacates Third Circuit Civil Riglfts Decision,
29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 849 (Aug. 21, 1998).
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Japanese chemical manufacturer.4 ° The case, which has generated considerable
attention and controversy, is expected to serve as the test case for Title VI
environmental justice claims." In September of 1998, Shintech announced its
decision to move the plant to a predominantly white community nearby, citing the
inconvenience of undergoing the EPA's investigation as the reason for its decision."
However, the EPA has not decided whether it will continue its investigation of
Louisiana's permitting processes statewide, and within the state's industrial
corridor.4
3
In what may be the first instance of a regulatory agency's refusal to grant a license
because of environmental justice concerns arising under Executive Order 12,898, a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") licensing panel in 1997 denied an energy
company's request to build a uranium-enrichment plant between two predominantly
black communities in northern Louisiana. 44 The NRC affirmed the panel's ruling the
following year, and said that more investigation would be required before the
proposed Claiborne Enrichment Center could be licensed.4 The energy company
withdrew its license application following the NRC's decision. 6 Environmental
justice advocates described the Claiborne Enrichment Center decision as an important
victory that would show other federal agencies how to take environmental justice
concerns into account.47 At that time, the EPA's troubled attempts to comply with
Executive Order 12,898 had just begun.
40. See First Citizen Petition Under Title VI Granted To Block Construction of Industrial
Facility, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 835 (Sept. 12, 1997).
41. See Black Caucus, EPA To Meet on Shintech; Dispute May Be Test Case on Title VI
Suits, 22 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 780 (July 24, 1998). It should also be noted that several
unsuccessful attempts have been made to pass environmental justice legislation. For a
discussion of those bills, see Knorr, supra note 31, at 85-89.
42. See Mike Dunne, Shintech Withdraws Plan: WBR Location Selected for Smaller
Facility, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 18, 1998, at IA.
43. See Vicki Ferstel, Shintech Change Won't End Environmental Justice Test Case,
BATON ROUGEADVOC., Sept. 18, 1998, at 11A.
44. See In the Matter of Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367 (1997); Energy
Company Denied License by NRC for Louisiana Uranium-Enrichment Plant, 28 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 48 (May 9, 1997).
45. See Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998); Licensing of Uranium
Enrichment Plant Needs More Study, Commission Decides, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2645 (Apr.
10, 1998).
46. See Louisiana Energy ServicesL.P., 47 N.R.C. at 113.
47. See Energy Consortium WithdrawsApplicationfor Uranium-Enrichment Plant License,
29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 23 (May 1, 1998).
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II. EPA'S RESPONSE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE MOVEMENT
From the time of its creation, EPA has indicated its unwillingness to incorporate
issues of racial discrimination into its environmental protection agenda, and has been
criticized by civil rights and environmental justice groups for this position.4" EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus told the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in
1971 that strict enforcement of Title VI antidiscrimination law was not part of the
Agency's environmental mandate. 9 Four years later, the Commission on Civil Rights
criticized the EPA for its failure to enforce Title VI, particularly its failure to demand
that municipal recipients of federal funds provide adequate sewer services in minority
communities." The Commission found that if the EPA did not take affirmative action
to ensure adequate sewer services, it would be "'responsible for perpetuating that
discrimination."'' Former New Mexico Governor Toney Anaya made a similar
criticism ofthe EPA's antidiscrimination efforts at the First National People of Color
Leadership Summit, stating that the EPA could only begin to redress disproportionate
minority environmental burdens by making fundamental changes in its attitude.1
2
Despite these criticisms, the EPA continued to view issues of discrimination as
outside its statutory purview into the early 1990s. In response to growing demands
for environmental justice, the EPA established an Environmental Equity Workgroup
("Workgroup") in 1990, assigning it the task of reviewing evidence of
disproportionate environmental burdens and recommending EPA action. 3 But in a
1992 article, then-Administrator William K. Reilly still emphasized the technical
nature of the EPA's role in environmental decisionmaking 4 and described the
preliminary findings of the Environmental Equity Workgroup as inconclusive.5 In
his article, Reilly argued that environmental protection benefits everyone and said the
recent charges of environmental discrimination against the EPA served to "infuriate"
him. 6
The Workgroup published its final report to the Administrator in June 1992, titled
Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for All Communities."7 The report, which had
been eagerly awaited by environmental justice advocates, concluded that "there is a
general lack of data on environmental health effects by race and income," with the
48. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 836-37.
49. See id. at 837.
50. See Torres, supra note 10, at 431-32.
51. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 838 (quoting 6 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1 974, at 595 (1975)).
52. See Former Governor Calls for Rethinking at EPA To Combat Effects of
"Environmental Racism", 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1655 (Nov. 1, 1991).
53. See ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992).
54. See William K. Reilly, EnvironmentalEquity: EPA'sPosition, EPAJ., Mar.-Apr. 1992,
at 18, 20.
55. See id. at 19.
56. Id at 18.
57. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, supra note 53.
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notable exception of lead poisoning. 8 In addition, the report recommended actions
the EPA should take to address "environmental equity" issues, including development
of more information on the issue, incorporation of considerations of environmental
equity, and improvements in the Agency's communication with minority and low-
income communities.5 9
Grassroots leaders found the report to be "a public relations ploy to diffuse the
issue,"6 and EPA's attitude toward environmental justice issues in general to be
wholly inadequate. Charles Lee of the United Church of Christ criticized the
Agency's continued use ofthe bureaucratic phrase "environmental equity" rather than
"environmental justice" as an indication of EPA's unwillingness to take grassroots
concerns seriously.6 Richard Moore, then with the grassroots SouthwestNetwork for
Environmental and Economic Justice ("SNEEJ"), echoed his disappointment with the
report: "There is no acknowledgment of the problem; there is no analysis of what is
causing the problem and an inadequate analysis of how to address the problem."'62
Minority community leaders also argued that the Workgroup had failed to solicit their
perspectives in preparing the report.63
This grassroots frustration with the EPA had been fueled by the leak of a
confidential EPA memo in early 1992, in which EPA Assistant Administrator Lewis
Crampton urged the Agency to win recognition for environmental equity efforts
"before the minority fairness issue reaches the 'flashpoint"' and before grassroots
leaders succeeded in garnering the support of mainstream groups such as civil rights
organizations, churches, and unions.' Some environmental justice advocates saw the
memo as the EPA's attempt to co-opt the movement and drive a wedge between
environmental justice groups and mainstream civil rights and environmental
organizations, rather than substantively address environmental justice concerns. 5
By 1993, with Clinton in office and Benjamin Chavis of the United Church of
Christ having served on the administration's transition team, the EPA appeared ready
to begin addressing environmental justice issues in a meaningful way. As a result of
the National Law Journal study, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights announced in
April of 1993 that it had begun an investigation into whether the EPA discriminates
against minorities in siting and enforcement decisions and that the EPA had
responded with concern about environmental equity in meetings with the
Commission.' In March of 1993, EPA Administrator Carol Browner made her first
speech about environmental justice to a forum of civil rights and environmental
58. Id. at 3.
59. See id. at4.
60. Robert D. Bullard, Environmentalism withJustice, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRAssRooTs 195, 196-97 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
61. See Marianne Lavelle, Residents Want "Justice, "the EPA Offers "Equity", NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 21, 1992, at 512.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See Bullard, supra note 60, at 195.
66. See Marianne Lavelle, EPA Enforcement To Be Probed by Rights Commission, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 3, 34.
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activists sponsored by the Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law.67
Browner indicated an important shift in the Agency's public stance regarding
environmental justice issues when she stated: "It is clear to me that lower income and
minority communities are disproportionately affected by environmental risks, and we
have got to be mindful about that in every decision we make at the Environmental
Protection Agency."68 Despite this stated commitment to environmental justice, the
EPA's first major environmentaljustice regulatory initiative, the Interim Guidance,69
would not go into effect until almost five years later.7
0
11l. EPA's TITLE VI INTEPIM GUIDANCE
EPA's new interim procedure for investigating complaints that pollution control
permits violate federal civil rights law7' was made public on February 10, 1998, five
days after it had gone into effect.' The new procedure applies only to permitting
decisions made by state and local agencies that receive funding from the EPA.73 The
introduction to the Interim Guidance explains that the document "is intended to
update the Agency's procedural and policy framework" to meet an increasing number
of challenges to permitting decisions.74 The Interim Guidance is specifically designed
to bring the EPA into compliance with Executive Order 12,898 by establishing
procedures to ensure that permits issued by EPA-funded agencies do not result in
discriminatory effects based on race, color, or national origin.75 The Interim Guidance
applies to permit modifications and renewals, as well as new permits.76
The Interim Guidance establishes an eight-step framework for processing a Title
VI permitting complaint. The basic framework is as follows:
1. "Acceptance of the Complaint"-Upon receipt of a complaint, the EPA's
Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") determines whether it states a valid claim.77 A
valid complaint is generally filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act.78
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Interim Guidance, supra note I.
70. See Policy Set for Handling of Complaints on Local, State Environmental Permits, 28
Env't Rep. (BNA) 2125 (Feb. 13, 1998).
71. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1.
72. See Policy Set for Handling of Complaints on Local, State Environmental Permits,
supra note 70.
73. See Interim Guidance, supra note 1. The procedure applies as well to state or local
programs that are not EPA-funded, so long as the state or local agency is itself an EPA funding
recipient. See id.
74. Id. at 2. Past EPA Title VI challenges had primarily involved allegations of
discrimination in employment or access to water and sewer systems. See id.
75. See id. at2.
76. See id. at 7.
77. Id at 4.
78. See id, This often will be the issuance of the final permit. See id. However, OCR may
waive the time limit for good cause. See id. at 6-7.
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2. "Investigation/Disparate Impact Assessment"--If a claim is accepted, OCR
conducts a factual investigation. If OCR makes an initial finding of disparate
impact, it will notify the recipient.79
3. "Rebuttal/Mitigation"---Upon notice of initial finding of disparate impact, the
recipient will have the opportunity to rebut the finding, propose a mitigation
plan, or justify the disparate impact. If the EPA accepts the rebuttal or
mitigation plan, no further action on the complaint is required."0
4. "Justification"--The recipient may attempt to show that it has a "substantial,
legitimate interest that justifies the decision to proceed with the permit
notwithstanding the disparate impact."'" OCR must also consider whether an
alternative exists that would satisfy the stated interest but eliminate or reduce
the disparate impact.8 2
5. "Preliminary Finding of Noncompliance"-If the recipient fails to rebut,
mitigate, or justify, the OCR will notify the recipient of a preliminary finding
of noncompliance. 3
6. "Formal Determination of Noncompliance"-If the recipient is unable to
demonstrate that the preliminary finding is incorrect or that it can achieve
compliance, OCR will issue a formal written determination of noncompliance
within fifty days of the preliminary finding of noncompliance. 4
7. "Voluntary Compliance"-The recipient is given ten days after the formal
determination of noncompliance to come into voluntary compliance. If the
recipient does not meet this deadline, OCR will initiate procedures to terminate
EPA funding."
8. "Informal Resolution"--OCR will pursue informal resolutions wherever
practicable at any time during this process.
8 6
The Interim Guidance included a request for comments and noted EPA's beliefthat
"robust stakeholder input" is necessary for addressing Title VI issues."s The Interim
79. Id. at 4. The Interim Guidance also provides a five-step framework for determining
whether a disparate impact exists. See id. at 7-10. Since the issuance of the Interim Guidance,
the EPA's Science Advisory Board has made recommendations as to the appropriate models
to be used to evaluate disparate impact. See SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses of
Disproportionate Impacts, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1310 (Oct. 30, 1998).
80. Interim Guidance, supra note I.
81. Id.
82. See id. To be a justifiable disparate impact, there must be an "articulable value to the
recipient in the permitted activity." Id. In evaluating justification, the OCR may consider
broader governmental interests, the seriousness of the disparate impact, whether the permit is
a renewal with demonstrated benefits, and whether any of the articulated benefits will benefit
the community at issue in the Title VI complaint. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
[Vol. 75:687
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DECISIONMAKING
Guidance did not indicate, however, that any stakeholder input had gone into the
development of the policy. After the Interim Guidance was released, the EPA created
an advisory committee to recommend changes.88
IV. FALLOUT
The hostile response to EPA's lnterim Guidance has come from stakeholdergroups
with very different concerns and agendas, but each has shared the conviction that the
EPA's action was an unwelcome attempt to take away that stakeholder's control over
environmental decisionmaking. The criticisms have come primarily from three
camps: state-level stakeholders, municipal-level stakeholders, and grassroots-level
stakeholders. This section examines the historical and political background behind
each of these groups' current struggle with the EPA over its environmental justice
policies.
A. State-Level Stakeholders: Environmental Council of States,
Western Governors 'Association, National Governors'
Association, State Attorneys General
After the issuance of the Interim Guidance in February of 1998, a number of state-
level organizations and officials quickly voiced their dissatisfaction with the new
policy. Those going public with their opposition included the Environmental Council
of States, the Western Governors' Association, the National Governors' Association,
and fourteen state Attorneys General. Their complaints all voiced the concern that the
new policy would take decisionmaking power away from state agencies and introduce
significant regulatory uncertainty into state permitting decisions.
1. Trend Toward Greater Local Control
in Environmental Policy
As this Note explains,89 the EPA's Interim Guidance establishes procedures
whereby the EPA may review any permitting decision that has prompted a Title VI
complaint, even if the state has issued a final permitting decision. This potential
federal "veto-power" over state environmental permitting decisions seemed to fly in
the face of EPA's increasing devolution of control to the states in the 1980s and
1990s.1' Beginning with the Reagan era, presidential administrations have
increasingly shifted environmental decisionmaking power to the state programs
88. See Browner Defends Release of Interim Policy on Processing'of Civil Rights
Complaints, 22 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 387 (May 22, 1998).
89. See discussion supra Part III.
90. See James P. Lester, A New Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 59, 59 (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990); Barry G. Rabe, Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Decentralization, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: REFORM OR REACTION?, supra
note 9, at 31, 32-34. For a more detailed history of environmental federalism, see Robert V.
Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1141 (1995).
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established by many of the important environmental acts of the 1970s, on the
assumption that states have the institutional capacity to handle such programs. 91 Some
state environmental agencies have succeeded in their expanded role as environmental
caretakers and have been dubbed the "new heroes" of environmental federalism for
their innovative regulatory strategies.' However, empirical studies of state
administration of pollution control programs have demonstrated that, in fact,
individual states vary widely in their ability and commitment to pursue environmental
protection.93 Other commentators suggest that the problem is not only one of uneven
state performance, but that EPA and other environmental actors have failed to
adequately distinguish between those environmental problems that states can best
address and those environmental problems that the federal government can best
address.94
Despite states' mixed record in administering environmental programs, the call for
increased decentralization and "flexibility" has only increased in recent years. The
1994 Republican ascendancy in the U.S. House of Representatives brought with it
powerful demands for Congress to turn management of numerous federal programs
over to the states.95 In the environmental context, states argue that they are in the best
position to make decisions about environmental issues that affect unique local
interests.' Not surprisingly, industry enthusiastically supports these demands for state
91. See Lester, supra note 90, at 59-61.
92. Rabe, supra note 90, at 32-34. Rabe notes that states have been the breeding ground
for innovation in areas including pollution prevention, regulatory integration, economic
incentives, emissions trading, and disclosure mandates. See id. at 34-39. Despite this
devolution of agency power, relations between the EPA and state environmental administrators
have remained strained. See Charles E. Davis & James P. Lester, Federalism and
Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
57, 60-61(James P. Lester ed., 1989).
93. See Lester, supra note 90, at 72-76; Rabe, supra note 90, at 40-41. Lester groups the
states into four categories: Progressives, which have both the commitment and institutional
capability to administer environmental programs (these include California, Florida, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin); Strugglers, which have the commitment but lack
institutional resources (these include Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, and Vermont); Delayers, which have the
institutional capacity but lack commitment to environmental protection (these include
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia); and Regressives, which lack both the commitment and
institutional capacity for environmental protection (these include Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming). See Lester, supra note 90, at 72-75. Thus,
according to Lester's research, only 14 of the 50 states have both an adequate commitment to
and capacity for administering environmental protection programs.
94. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 1 (1997); Rabe, supra note 90, at
49.
95. See Dan Balz, Governors Press Congress for Power To Manage Programs at State
Level, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1994, at A6.
96. See WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICSAND POLICY 143-44 (3d ed.
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discretion in administering environmental programs.97 Furthering this insistence upon
increased local control is a pervasive rhetoric that the federal government is
"besieging" states and individuals with onerous environmental regulation, particularly
in the western states.98 Given the current political backdrop, it is anything but
surprising that the EPA's assertion of its power to review state permitting decisions
met with hostile reaction from state-level interests.
2. Numerous State Interests Oppose
Interim Guidance
The first state-level interest to express its dissatisfaction with the new Interim
Guidance was the Environmental Council of States ("ECOS"), which is comprised
of the top environmental officials of forty-nine states, as well as two U.S. territories
and the District of Columbia.' At its annual meeting, ECOS members passed a
resolution urging the EPA to withdraw its Interim Guidance, saying that it "would
clearly disrupt the management of environmental permit programs" and suggesting
a number of principles that the EPA should incorporate into future environmental
justice initiatives." 0 The resolution noted that, despite ECOS members' repeated
message to the EPA that states needed to be involved in the development of major
environmental policies to be carried out by the states, "[s]tates have not had a
significant role in the development of U.S. EPA's interim guidance."'0 ' The
resolution states ECOS's commitment to "environmental equity," but appears to
adopt the EPA's pre-1994 formulation of that issue, noting in a manner reminiscent
of former Administrator Reilly 2 that the Interim Guidance "extend[s] well beyond
traditional authority of U.S. EPA and State environmental programs."0 3
ECOS' principles for acceptable Title VI guidance include the following demands:
The EPA must assist states in complying with Title VI and avoid policies with the
"effect of shifting permit decision-making from States to the federal
government"; °4
1995).
97. See id.
98. For an interesting example of this rhetoric, typical of the wise use, multi-use, and
property rights movements, see WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY, WARONTHE WEST: GOVERNMENT
TYRANNY ON AMERICA'S GREAT FRONTIER (1995).
99. See State Agency Chiefs Ask EPA To Withdraw New Guidance on Civil Rights
Complaints, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2531 (Apr. 3, 1998).
100. Resolution Number 98-2, Environmental Protection Agency's Interim Guidance for
Investigating Environmental Permit Challenges (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.sso.org/
ecosfresolutions/98-2.htm>.
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying note 53.
103. Resolution Number 98-2, supra note 100.
104. Id.
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Any Title VI guidance must allow states to implement "alternative environmental
equity programs" so long as they comply with Title VI;"°s
Any Title VI guidance must provide definite time frames, definitions, and
methodologies; ° and
Any Title VI guidance must address conflicts with existing laws. 07
Echoing many of the concerns found in the ECOS resolution, fourteen state
attorneys general soon followed suit in asking the EPA to withdraw the Interim
Guidance.' In a letter to EPA Administrator Carol Browner, the attorneys
emphasized that the Interim Guidance did not adequately account for the realities of
state permitting processes." ° Of particular concern to the letter's signatories was the
Interim Guidance's applicability to final permits: "Rather than placing itself in the
role of the 'Monday morning quarterback' who second-guesses state decisions," the
letter said the agency would be better served by building Title VI compliance
requirements into state permitting procedures."0 The attorneys general also indicated
concerns about the Interim Guidance's lack of specificity, particularly its failure to
provide criteria for a finding of disparate impact and its potential conflict with other
zoning and environmental laws."'
The National Governors' Association also voiced the opinion that the EPA's
Interim Guidance goes beyondthe scope ofExecutive Order 12,898." 12 One governor,
John Engler of Michigan, has been particularly hostile to the EPA's Interim
Guidance. Engler blamed the Interim Guidance for Select Steel's announced decision
to forego plans to build in Flint because it was the subject of a Title VI
investigation."' Calling the new Interim Guidance "reckless" and "ill-defined,"
Engler said the EPA is a "jobkiller" imposing its will over the Flint community and
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See id. The resolution cites local zoning laws, brownfield programs, and urban
economic development programs as examples of laws with the potential to conflict with Title
VI guidance. See id. A representative of one state environmental organization presented these
concerns before a congressional subcommittee a few months later. See EPA "s Title VI Interim
Guidance andAlternative State Approaches: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 37-41 (1998) (testimony of
Michael J. Hogan, Counselor to the Comm'r, State of N.J.; Dep't of Envtl. Protection).
108. See EPA Civil Rights Policy Lacks Recognition of State Permit Processes, Attorneys
Say, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 183 (May 15, 1998).
109. See id. New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco was the lead author of the letter. See
id.
1 10. Id.
Il l. See id.
112. See Vicki Ferstel, Executive Order Draws Attention to New Concern, BATON ROUGE
ADVOC., June 23, 1998, at IA.
113. See Michigan Governor Blames EPA Policy for Company Decision To Scrap Factory
Plan, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 995 (Sept. 18, 1998).
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punishing industry."' The EPA dismissed the complaint within weeks of Engler's
comments."'
In June of 1998, the Western Governors' Association ("WGA") joined the chorus
of disapproval by requesting withdrawal of the Interim Guidance."6 A resolution
passed at the organization's annual meeting stated that the Interim Guidance "was
adopted essentially without input from states," and should be replaced with a policy
developed in cooperation with representatives from state environmental agencies." 7
The concerns and demands ofthe WGA's resolution largely mirror earlier opposition
documents: a need for recognition of "alternative state approaches" to Title VI
compliance,"' a need for more precise standards and methodologies, and a need for
EPA to support states in incorporating environmental justice concerns into the
permitting process." 9
3. Rectifying EPA's Missteps with
State-Level Stakeholders
It is probably unrealistic to imagine that any EPA guidance asserting the agency's
authority to review state-level permitting decisions would be warmly received by
state interests. However, EPA's failure to work with states in drafting the Interim
Guidance and failure to recognize states' legitimate need for regulatory certainty" °
has resulted in an unnecessarily high level of backlash from state-level interests. The
EPA's obligation to strictly enforce the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VI need
not offend states that are truly committed to incorporating environmental justice into
theirpermitting procedures. The EPA should improve its relationships with state-level
interests in three ways. First, it must gather input from state-level interests and
incorporate state-level concerns where appropriate.' 2 ' Second, it needs to establish
clear default standards and deadlines to build into state permitting processes to further
regulatory certainty. Third, while the EPA cannot assume that states are willing and
114. Id.
115. See EPA Dismisses Michigan Complaint; State Officials Still Wary of New Policy, 22
Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1256 (Nov. 6, 1998).
116. See Western Governors' Association Joins Calls for EPA To Withdraw Civil Rights
Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 570 (July 10, 1998).
117. Western Governors'Association, Environmental ProtectionAgency Interim Guidance
for Addressing Environmental Justice Challenges to Permits (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http:ll
www.westgov.orgwga/policy/98009.htm>.
118. New Jersey and Texas are states that have implemented their own environmental justice
programs which incorporate equity issues early in the permitting process. See David Sive &
Lemuel M. Srolovic, Environmental Justice Issues Develop: Facility Permits and CivilRights,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 1998, at SI.
119. See Western Governors'Association, supra note 117.
120. For a discussion of the importance of regulatory ceriainty, see William W. Buzbee,
RememberingRepose: Voluntary Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, andthe Costs ofInterminable
Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 96 (1995).
121. Recommendations for increased stakeholder participation in EPA decisionmaking can
be found in ENTERPRiSE FOR THE ENV'T, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, THE
ENvIRONmENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: TOWARDA MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE
41-43 (1998).
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able to meet their Title VI obligations," it can work with interested state agencies to
develop alternative Title VI compliance policies, establishing minimum conditions
that must be met before states can implement alternative policies."
B. Municipal-Level Stakeholders: U.S. Conference of Mayors,
Chamber of Commerce, Black Chamber of Commerce
State-level interests were not alone in opposing the EPA's Interim Guidance as an
attempt to wrest control of permitting decisions away from nonfederal units of
government. Perhaps the most vocal opponent of the new Interim Guidance has been
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 24 which shares many of the state-level interests'
concerns about the Interim Guidance's lack of regulatory certainty and EPA's failure
to incorporate stakeholder input. The Conference of Mayors and the Black Chamber
of Commerce have emphasized an additional concern: that the Interim Guidance will
frustrate attempts to draw industrial development into predominantly minority urban
communities. 5 Given that the NAACP and the Congressional Black Caucus have
been strong advocates of environmental justice initiatives, 6 it is an indicator of the
complex nature of the politics surrounding this issue that some of the EPA Interim
Guidance's strongest opponents have been mayors who represent predominantly
minority communities. A closer look at the political landscape of poor urban
communities helps to explain this irony.
122. For a discussion of states' varying levels of commitment and ability to administer
environmental regulations, see supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
123. This approach to resolving conflicts of environmental federalism is suggested in
Percival, supra note 90, at 1177-78.
124. Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer's opposition to the guidance received coverage in the
mainstream media. See, e.g., Lynette Clemetson, A Green Bottom Line: Black Leaders Struggle
To Balance Jobs, Pollution, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1998, at 53.
125. See Pollution in Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
(1998), available in 1998 WL 12763210 [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Harry C. Alford,
President, National Black Chamber of Commerce, Inc.); Environmental Justice: US.
Conference of Mayors Calls on EPA To Suspend Guidance on Civil Rights, 29 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 469 (June 26, 1998);
126. See EPA Bungling Leaves "Environmental Justice" Elusive, USA TODAY, July 20,
1998, at 14A; NAACP Head Demands EnvironmentatAction, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 5,
23. The Congressional Black Caucus has criticized the mitigation and justification provisions
of the Interim Guidance, however. See Black Caucus, EPA To Meet on Shintech; Dispute May
Be Test Case on Title VI Suits, 22 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 780 (July 24, 1998).
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1. Environmental Movement's Perceived
Disregard of Minority Urban Issues
The municipal-level stakeholder reaction to the EPA's Interim Guidance must be
considered in light of minority communities' historical suspicion of the agenda of
mainstream environmental agencies and organizations. While minority urban
communities do care about environmental issues, they tend to care more about
pollution problems that directly affect them and less about "preservation of wildlife
and wilderness.' 127 To the extent that environmental agencies and organizations have
focused or have been perceived to focus their energies on conservation issues,
minority urban communities have seen the environmental movement as irrelevant to
their lives. As a result of these perceptions and of institutional racism, minorities have
historically not been involved in environmental decisionmaking.' 28
As the environmental movementgained momentum in the early 1970s, this strained
relationship became the subject of a national conference attended by representatives
ofmainstream environmental organizations, civil rights organizations, and municipal
governments. 29 Conferees noted the perceived disconnect between the concerns of
environmentalists and the concerns of the urban poor and pointed out that the urban
poor often see the environmental movement as a "deliberate attempt by a bigoted and
selfish white middle-class society to perpetuate its own values and protect its own life
style at the expense of the poor and the underprivileged."'3 ° One commentator noted
that this disconnect allows corporations to portray environmentalists as "not giving
a damn" about jobs and human welfare.''
This historical disconnect is furthered by the economic realities of many
predominantly minority urban areas. Many minority communities have fewer
resources to fight the siting of polluting industries and "are more likely than others
to tolerate pollution-generating commercial development in the hope that economic
benefits will inure to the community in the form ofjobs, increased taxes, and civic
improvements."' 32 Observers frequently characterize this trade off between jobs and
freedom from pollution as environmental blackmail.' When faced with the
127. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black Brown, Red, and Poisoned, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICEAND COMMUNITIESOF COLOR, supra note 4, at 57-58.
128. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 811-12.
129. See James Noel Smith, Preface to ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
URBAN AMERICA at ix, x (James Noel Smith ed., 1974).
130. James Noel Smith, The Coming ofAge of Environmentalism in American Society, in
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 129, at 1, 2.
In reality, America's mainstream environmental organizations vary widely in their level of
commitment to environmental justice and environmental issues affecting urban populations.
The Sierra Club was an early proponent of environmental justice issues, whereas other
organizations are more exclusively focused upon conserving wildlife and wilderness areas. See
Jeffrey St. Clair & Benrardo Issel, A Field Guide to the Environmental Movement, IN THESE
TIMES, July 28, 1997, at 17.
131. Smith, supra note 130, at 4.
132. Austin & Schill, supra note 127, at 55.
133. See Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental
Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE
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alternative of allowing devastating economic conditions to continue, many African-
American civil rights and political leaders have opted for bringing more industry into
their communities despite the potential trade off of increased pollution.'34 And, given
the environmental mainstream's historical agenda, poor urban communities may be
skeptical of environmentalists' attempts to improve the situation.,35
2. Mayors Oppose Interim Guidance
When set against this historical and political backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising
that the mayor leading the charge against the EPA's Interim Guidance was Detroit's
Dennis Archer, who has worked to bring industrial investment to his economically
ailing, predominantly black city.'36 The U.S. Conference of Mayors in June of 1998
unanimously adopted Archer's resolution urging the EPA to suspend the Interim
Guidance.'37 The Conference of Mayors expressed concerns that the Interim
Guidance "will stifle inner-city development and strip minorities of job
opportunities," take away decisionmaking power from local governments, and create
regulatory uncertainty for industries.'
In the same vein, the Chamber of Commerce and Black Chamber of Commerce,
as representatives of their local chapter organizations, have opposed the Interim
Guidance on the grounds that "[m]inority and low-income communities in this
country are sorely in need of the jobs, tax revenues, and other benefits that industrial
facilities bring with them."'39 The President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
accused the EPA of trying to become a "national zoning board" by overturning state
and local development decisions. 140
Despite Administrator Browner's insistence thatthe EPA is committed to achieving
both urban economic development and environmental protection for all citizens, the
EPA has not determined how it will address minority support of an industrial project
in resolving Title VI permitting complaints. 14 1 In July of 1998, Archer made clear in
a meeting with Administrator Browner his belief that urban mayors are in a better
position than the EPA to make decisions about community redevelopment and about
protecting minority citizens. 42 In response to the mayors' criticisms, Browner
GRASSROOTS, supra note 60, at 15, 23.
134. See id. at 22-23; Lazarus, supra note 14, at 808.
135. See Dialogue: Attitudes Toward Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITYAND
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 129, at 37, 42.
136. See Clemetson, supra note 124, at 53.
137. See David Mastio, Archer Tackles the EPA: U.S. Mayors Back His Call To Suspend
Race-Based Policy, DET. NEWS, June 23, 1998, at Al.
138. Id.; see also Environmental Justice: U.S. Conference of Mayors Calls on EPA To
Suspend Guidance on Civil Rights, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 469 (June 26, 1998).
139. Hearings, supra note 125 (testimony of Harry C. Alford, President, National Black
Chamber of Commerce, Inc.).
140. Chamber Seeks Minority Business Support in Dispute with Agency over Title VI Policy,
29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 614 (July 17, 1998).
141. See Ferstel, supra note 112, at IA.
142. See Mayors Rap EPA at Meeting with Browner for Failure To Consult on Interim
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acknowledged that perhaps the EPA should have solicited municipal-level input
before issuing the Interim Guidance.' At that meeting, Browner also offered the
EPA's first statement of the goals of the Interim Guidance: "First, to provide citizens
with input into decisionmaking and swift resolution of their concerns. Second, to give
businesses a climate of certainty that fosters development. And third, not to second-
guess responsible local and state decisionmaking."'"
3. Rectifying EPA's Missteps with
Municipal-Level Interests
In 1993, sociologist Robert Bullard predicted the quandary the EPA finds itself in
today. He wrote that unless environmental initiatives address the profound economic
concerns of poor communities of color, "people of color and poor white workers are
likely to end up siding with corporate managers in key conflicts concerning the
environment."' 45 Certainly that is the situation that has developed in response to the
EPA's Interim Guidance, as mayors of poor, minority cities find themselves more
closely allied with industry interests like the Chamber of Commerce than with the
NAACP.
To correct its missteps, the EPA must first work to include these municipal leaders
in its development of environmental justice initiatives, working to counter the
historical perception that environmental agencies do not care about the problems of
minority urban communities. Second, the EPA must move beyond mere rhetoric in
proving the point that economic development and environmental protection can occur
at the same time." Municipal-level interests have shown that they are doubtful that
both goals can be achieved at once, 47 and do not want to cede control to the EPA to
determine which alternative is preferable. If the EPA wants to have credibility with
municipal interests, it must provide urban leaders with concrete, real-world examples
of the simultaneous achievement of the two goals, and involve municipal interests in
Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24, 1998).
143. See id.
144. Carol M. Browner, Remarks PreparedforDelivery, Environmental Justice Roundtable,
Detroit MI, July 17, 1998 (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ejlhtml-
doc/ejremark.htm>.
145. Bullard, supra note 133, at 23.
146. The head of the Michigan Environmental Council argued in the Detroit News that"[i]f
Detroit hopes to follow in the footsteps of other American cities that have already enjoyed an
urban renaissance, it will have to clean itself up, not allow itself to be used as an environmental
dumping ground." Lana Pollack, Environmental Justice Fights Race Bias, DET. NEWs, July
2, 1998, at A13. Pollack also suggested that "economic Armageddon" arguments were
reminiscent of the rhetoric used to fight the civil rights movement. Id.
147. It is interesting to note that most Americans believe we can have growth and a clean
world. See EVERETr CARL LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN, ATTrrUDEs TOWARD THE
ENVIRONMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER EARTH DAY 9 (1995). The National Resources
Defense Council has challenged the argument that it is necessary to choose between
environmental justice or pursuing economic development. See Permits Cited in Civil Rights
Complaints Have Remained Valid, EPA OfficialSays, 152 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Aug.
7, 1998).
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the development of plans to increase economic development while ensuring
environmental protection.'48
C. Community-Level Stakeholders:
Grassroots Environmental Justice Organizations
The EPA's Interim Guidance offers community-based environmental justice
organizations an important tool for challenging the siting of polluting facilities in
minority neighborhoods. Financially strapped community organizations are likely to
view filing an administrative complaint with the EPA as a welcome alternative to
lawsuits. However, the EPA's repeated assertions to state and municipal level
stakeholders that it has yet to overturn a permitting decision under the Interim
Guidance is likely to bring little reassurance to community groups that the new policy
will aggressively protect their civil rights.' In addition, the EPA's failure to involve
grassroots leaders in developing the Interim Guidance5 ' is likely to alienate
communities that already see the EPA as not protective of their interests. The EPA
must gain a better understanding of the principles and priorities of grassroots
environmental organizations if it wants to involve these groups in future
environmental justice initiatives.
1. Grassroots Strategies
Grassroots environmental justice organizations believe that good environmental
decisionmaking requires participation from members of affected communities.'' In
line with this philosophy, organizations such as the Southwest Organizing Project
("SWOP") and SNEEJ have emphasized hands-on tactics, such as meetings,
demonstrations, and petitions.'52 While legal action may constitute part of an
organization's arsenal of tactics, there is a "certain skepticism about the efficacy of
litigation in advancing the goals of minority grass-roots environmentalism," perhaps
because community members feel an alienation from and distrust of the judicial
system.'53 In fact, public interest attorney Luke Cole has argued that litigation serves
as one of the least useful strategies for grassroots organizations."S4
148. See Roger H. Bezdek, The Net Impact of Environmental Protection on Jobs and the
Economy, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 86 (Bunyan Bryant
ed., 1995).
149. See Permits Cited in Civil Rights Complaints Have Remained Valid, EPA Official Says,
supra note 147.
150. See EPA Official Says Consultation Before Guidance Release Insufficient, 22 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 779 (July 24, 1998).
*151. See Daniel Faber, Introduction to THE STRUGGLE FOR ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES I (Daniel Faber ed., 1998).
152. See Austin & Schill, supra note 127, at 63-64.
153. Id.
154. See Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David s Sling,
21 FORD. URB. L.J. 523, 524 (1994). Others have agreed that Title VI litigation is not the
solution in the environmental racism context. See Light & Rand, supra note 36, at 38.
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Grassroots environmental justice organizations tend to have little faith that the
government will intervene to solve their problems.' Richard Moore, Coordinator of
SNEEJ, describes his region's EPA office as "located in a bank building, with guards,
that many of our community folk don't have access to. This is symbolic of the
general character of the EPA and the U.S. government."' 6 The release of the EPA
memo urging co-optation ofthe grassroots environmentaIjustice movement' 5 7 served
to reinforce this grassroots perception that the EPA sets itself apart from American
communities and lacks a commitment to identifying and remedying environmental
injustice within them.
2. Remedying EPA's Missteps with
Community-Level Interests
While the severe backlash from state and municipal level interests has convinced
the EPA that it erred in failing to involve those stakeholders in the development of
the lnterim Guidance,'58 its failure to involve grassroots organizations may pose more
serious consequences for the legitimacy of EPA's Interim Guidance and future
environmental justice initiatives. The environmental justice movement, as noted
above,'59 is the product of community organizations that have developed their own
approaches to fighting disproportionate pollution burdens in their neighborhoods. As
a result, only by involving affected minority groups in the decisionmaking process
can the EPA alter its agency culture to understand and address environmental
injustice."6 In particular, "members of affected minority groups themselves are the
most appropriate ones to identify and prioritize the economic, social, health,
educational, and environmental issues for their communities."'' Of course, EPA
cannot abdicate its important role in environmental justice decisionmaking; it must
maintain that role in order to meet its statutory obligations under Title VT. 62 But the
EPA must do better than simply creating Title VI procedures that environmental
justice groups may or may not use to further their objectives.
155. See Austin & Schill, supra note 127, at 62.
156. Paul Almeida, The Networkfor Environmental and Economic Justice in the Southwest:
An Interview with Richard Moore, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15 1, at 182.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
158. See EPA Official Says Consultation Before Guidance Release Insufficient, supra note
150, at A-9.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 148-5 1.
160. See Torres, supra note 10, at 453.
161. Id.
162. For a discussion of the ways in which environmental professionals should be involved
in the environmental justice movement, see Conner Bailey et al., Environmental Justice and
the Professional, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS, supra note
148, at 35. The authors suggest that agencies attempting to further environmental justice
should hire community relations coordinators to improve the sharing of information between
the agency and the community. See id. at 40.
2000]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CONCLUSION: LESSONS To BE LEARNED
FROM THE INTERIM GUIDANCE
Perhaps the most obvious lesson that the EPA will learn from the profound
dissatisfaction with its 1998 Interim Guidance centers around the importance of
involving the multiple levels of environmental stakeholders in the environmental
justice decisionmaking process-state, municipal, and grassroots. This idea of
"stakeholder participation" is now quite popular and widely touted in many
regulatory arenas, especially in the environmental context. A new report argues that
well-designed stakeholder involvement is crucial to environmental decisionmaking,'63
while a recent study of the EPA found that the agency must improve stakeholder
participation."6 EPA's experience with response to its Interim Guidance suggests that
this lesson applies in the environmental justice context as well. Stakeholder
involvement will likely create an atmosphere of increased good faith, and may help
the EPA avoid some basic public relations missteps.
But the recent spate of controversy over the EPA's guidelines offers a more
complex lesson for the agency. Environmental justice efforts necessarily raise a
complicated set of political conflicts. Increased stakeholder participation will not
likely resolve the fundamental philosophical differences that form the real root of
much of the dissatisfaction over the Interim Guidance--differences that arise from
the fundamental question of which group or groups should have decisionmaking
power when it comes to environmental justice issues.
If the EPA is to succeed in furthering environmental justice goals, it cannot
continue to do so while turning a blind eye to the complex political histories and
agendas that stakeholders at the state, municipal, and community levels bring to
environmental justice policy making. Environmental justice regulators also need to
realize that they cannot please each of these groups of stakeholders and develop a
meaningful environmental justice program.
As the EPA refines the environmental justice guidelines embodied in the Interim
Guidance'65 and undertakes other environmental justice initiatives, it must address
some fundamental issues. First, it must explicitly define the objectives of its
environmental justice policy. As part of this analysis, the EPA needs to determine
whether it has the institutional commitment and wherewithal to enforce federal civil
rights laws in the face of sometimes determined local and commercial opposition.
Second, the EPA needs to more clearly define state and federal roles in environmental
justice decisionmaking by identifying the concrete ways in which state permitting
processes can help prevent disproportional environmental impacts, but reserving
163. See TERRY F. YOSIE & TIMOTHY D. HERBST, USING STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING: AN EVALUATION OF LESSONS LEARNED, KEY ISSUES,
AND FUTURE CHALLENGES (1998).
164. See ENVERPRISE FOR THE ENV'T, supra note 121, at 49.
165. The EPA had planned to issue draft revised guidelines in the fall of 1999. See EPA To
Issue Draft Revision this Fall of Guidance for Civil Rights Act Title VI, 169 Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) A-1 (Sept. 1, 1999). However, the EPA had not yet issued revised guidelines at the time
this Issue went to press, and the EPA does not expect to issue revised guidelines for several
months. Telephone Interview with Mavis Sanders, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of
Civil Rights (Jan. 24, 2000).
[Vol. 75:687
2000] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DECISIONMAKING 709
other decisionmaking and enforcement activities exclusively to the federal
government. Finally, the EPA should develop long-term strategies to debunk the
seeming conflict between environmental protection and community development that
is at the core of this environmental justice stakeholders' debate. The longer that
stakeholders perceive a necessary trade off between environmental quality and jobs
in their community, the less success EPA will have guaranteeing rich and poor
communities alike the benefits of a safe environment. Until the agency specifically
addresses these key issues, the winds of opposition from various stakeholders will
continue to buffet EPA's environmental justice policies, and will prevent EPA from
making meaningful progress in enforcing the guarantees of Title VI in the
environmental context.

